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Abstract 
This paper provides an account of an action research study into the 
systemic success factors which help frontline staff react to and recover 
from a rail service disruption. This study focuses on the effective use 
of information during a disruption to improve customer service, as this 
is a priority area for train-operating companies (TOCs) in Great Britain.  
A novel type of systems thinking, known as Process-Oriented Holonic 
Modelling (PrOH), has been used to investigate and model the 
‘Passenger Information During Disruption’ (PIDD) system. 
This paper presents conceptual requirements for a gamified learning 
environment; it describes ‘what’; ‘how’ and ‘when’ these systemic 
success factors could be gamified using a popular disruption 
management reference framework known as the Mitigate, Prepare, 
React and Recover (MPRR) framework. 
This paper will interest managers of and researchers into customer 
service system disruptions, as well as those wishing to develop new 
gamified learning environments to improve customer service systems.    
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1. BACKGROUND 
The number of rail journeys across Great Britain’s (GB’s) rail network hit a record-
breaking 1.65 billion in 2014-15 (Rail Delivery Group, 2015). The network has 
become increasingly overcrowded and, for decades, has been perceived by its users 
as lagging behind the performance of those in other leading national economies 
(DfT, 2004). In light of this and with increasing dissatisfaction by passengers in Great 
Britain, the GB’s Rail Technology Strategy (RTS) stated that the management 
system for ‘Passenger Information During Disruption’ (PIDD) had to be significantly 
improved (RSSB and TSLG, 2012). Similarly, the Passenger Focus 2014 report 
revealed that three of the top twelve rail passengers’ improvement priorities directly 
related to information use during disruptions: “train companies [need to] keep 
passengers informed about delays” (5th), “accurate and timelier information [must be] 
available at stations” (8th), and “accurate and timelier information [must be] provided 
on trains” (12th) (Passenger Focus, 2014). Disruptions cause the re-planning of 
services and can last from hours to days (Pender, 2012). 
 
On a more positive note, the processes, procedures and information systems for 
planning tactical or operational services during normal periods of service operation 
are, on the whole, considered as coping adequately, but, during disruptions, the 
systems, channels of communication, decision makers and fora for decision-making 
often become quickly overloaded and currently lack the ability to characterise 
disruptions accurately enough and reschedule services quickly enough 
(Narayanaswami and Rangaraj, 2012). This is because normal planning systems 
struggle to react to ever-changing operational characteristics such as the dispatching 
of trains (Caimi et al., 2012), dynamic movements of trains (Kraseman, 2012), 
changing network capacity (Luéthi et al. 2007; Törnquist and Persson, 2007), route 
conflicts (Goverde and Meng, 2012) and other dynamic real-time operating 
characteristics (Corman et al., 2011; D’Ariano et al., 2008; Diaz et al., 1999; Gatto et 
al., 2009; Wȕst et al., 2008) during the course of a disruption.  
 
To date, research has tended to focus on mathematical optimisation and 
rescheduling of trains and networks, which usually requires high computational 
processing power which is difficult to deliver in real-time for use by frontline staff 
faced with hundreds (or thousands) of frustrated customers. Perhaps this is because 
deciding on a real-time set of objective criteria for rescheduling is just too difficult to 
define (Yoko and Norio, 2005) and/or too impractical to implement. In contrast, this 
research has focused on the immediate interface between frontline staff and 
customers and the generation of requirements for a heuristic (Espinosa-Aranda and 
Garcia-Ródenas, 2013; Törnquist, 2007) and game-based experiential learning 
capability (Deterding et al., 2011) for frontline staff with emphasis on learning rather 
than on optimisation. Other such non-optimisation approaches have been used to 
investigate other types of delays in rail also not well suited to mathematical 
optimisation models (e.g. Harris et al., 2013; Tschirner et al., 2014), but these 
previous studies do not lay out any requirements for gamifying frontline staff 
development and customer service improvement, as in this paper.  
 
In contrast, the aim of this action research project was to increase a TOC’s customer 
satisfaction rates whilst simultaneously reducing its operational costs through better 
use of information during disruptions by frontline staff. To do this, this paper states 
what holistic systemic success factors affect the Passenger Information During 
Disruption (PIDD) management system (as per Golightly and Dadashi, 2017; 
Tschirner et al., 2014); it also recommends how these may be improved using a 
gamified learning environment and when they should be used within the Mitigate, 
Prepare, Respond and Recover (MPRR) emergency / disruption response 
framework (Drabek, 1996; Fischer, 1998). This research particularly focuses on the 
latter response and recovery phases of MPRR (Espinosa-Aranda and Garcia-
Ródenas, 2013) and defines conceptual requirements for a gamifying them in a low-
risk learning environment to improve the overall PIDD management system (as per 
van Lankveld et al., 2017). 
 
This project has been conducted with Chiltern Railways (CR) which operate a 
mainline passenger service between the West Midlands (Birmingham and its 
surrounding counties) and London (Marylebone); they run approximately 126,000 
services per annum (2% of all GB services) and have higher-than-average 
passenger satisfaction rates for the sector (ranked 3rd out of 23 GB’s TOCs in 2015). 
Chiltern is part of the Arriva Group owned by Deutsche Bahn. CR aims to improve 
their customer ranking by making systemic improvements to their people, process 
and technological resources. This study took place between November 2013 and 
April 2015. For reference purposes, a map of the CR network is given in Appendix 1 
and, due to the high level of rail-specific terminology used in this paper (Golightly 
and Dadashi, 2017), a glossary is given in Appendix 2. 
 
2. APPROACH 
2.1 Abductive Canonical Action Research (CAR) – an Overview 
The Canonical Action Research (CAR) ontological process (Susman and Evered, 
1978) was followed to ensure that an effective action research project was delivered; 
to facilitate this, a novel type of Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) (Checkland and 
Scholes, 1996) was used, known as Process-Oriented Holonic (PrOH) Modelling 
(Clegg, 2007) (see Section 2.2). The ontological process of Canonical Action 
Research (CAR) (Susman and Evered, 1978) was suitable for this project as it 
allows real-world situations to be selected, respective roles to be assigned to people 
in situ (participants) and enquiries about situational conditions (as per Checkland 
and Scholes, 1996) to be made for retuning elements of the “real world” PIDD 
management system. Together, this action research team made sense of such 
situations by referring to the Mitigate, Prepare, React and Recover (MPRR) 
intellectual framework (see Section 2.3). Checkland has stated that “there must be 
an intellectual framework, declared in advance, in which general learning outcomes 
can be defined. Without such a framework, action research can quickly become 
indistinguishable from mere action” (Checkland, 1981, p.400). In this project, PrOH 
Modelling served as the specific modelling methodology to enquire into and depict 
the PIDD management system (see Section 2.2) while the MPRR framework served 
as the declared intellectual reference framework (see Section 2.3). 
2.2 PrOH Modelling Methodology   
 
Clegg’s PrOH Modelling Methodology (2007) was used to facilitate the canonical 
action research process. Systemic models, constructed via PrOH Modelling, are 
considered holons, where a holon is a defensible model of a system under 
observation—which has subsystems within it and may also be part of a higher-level 
system (Edwards, 2005; Koestler, 1967). PrOH modelling, like all SSMs, is built upon 
action research principles; however, unlike other SSMs, PrOH modelling’s novelty 
lies in the fact that it can explore systemic issues by modelling process-oriented 
holons, and building sets of holons into holarchies as necessary.  
 
PrOH modelling can also, quite uniquely, be story-boarded to facilitate discussion 
around complex systemic success factors. As such, PrOH modelling has previously 
successfully helped organisations form consensus about radical systemic change 
(Clegg, 2007) and helped overcome aspects of the operations management 
improvement paradox (Keating et al., 1999). Figure 1 gives the generic template for 
a PrOH model on which all PrOH models are based. The initial model for this project 
was also based on this template and re-iterated after each action research cycle in 
which disruptive incident types were time-lined and work-shopped using a story-
boarded version (a scene-by-scene account) of the latest PrOH model iteration. 
PrOH models may be thought of as a “mental model” used to explore the PIDD 
management system as “operators need clear goals, about what to achieve: mental 
models are their necessary understanding of the involved systems and processes, 
helping to utilise controllability over a process based on provided observability” 
(Tschirner, 2014, p.88). 
 
 Fig. 1. PrOH Model holonic template – “key human resource of current process 
phase produce core transformed output”. Source: Clegg & Shaw (2008) 
 
Figure 1 shows a PrOH model template; the bold arrows in the PrOH model template 
run from top left to bottom right and show the core process description which is 
necessary to build any holon. The remaining paths in the template show descriptions 
of supporting activities which are added to and adapted from speciﬁc instantiations of 
the template. Green bubbles contain tangible artefacts, red bubbles contain people 
or groups of people, and white bubbles intangible factors. 
Holons may be strategically, tactically or operationally pitched, and can be 
connected vertically upwards through abstraction techniques, or vertically 
downwards through refinement techniques (whether processes are sequentially or 
parallelically connected); they can also be connected laterally by sequential chaining. 
The detailed techniques for doing this are not covered in this paper due to reasons of 
brevity. Instead, this paper focuses on the PIDD management system as the system 
under observation using a single PrOH model, which was storyboarded and used in 
incident review workshops to “theory match” the system under observation to 
suitable reference frameworks (Spens and Kovacs, 2006), critique chronological 
events, identify systemic success factors and ultimately contribute toward a set of 
new conceptual requirements for a gamified learning environment (as described in 
Sections 4, 5 and 6). 
2.3 Mitigate, Prepare, Respond and Recover Framework (MPRR). 
 
Through “theory matching” (Spens and Kovacs, 2006) the MPPR framework came to 
serve as an a priori intellectual framework upon which to reflect disruptive incident 
findings and from which to compare and contrast and develop some new conceptual 
requirements for a new gamified learning environment for the PIDD management 
system. There are many MPRR type frameworks to choose from (Belmonte et al., 
2011; Jennex and Raman, 2009). The MPRR theoretical framework was chosen for 
this research as it is a simple framework endorsed by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and is used by the USA’s Homeland Security to deal 
with disasters (Drabek, 1996; Fischer, 1996). It needs little explanation other than to 
say it has four phases: (1) mitigate—referring to activities performed to prevent a 
disruption from happening; (2) prepare—relating to planning activities needed to 
perform in case of a disruption; (3) respond—relating to activities to cope with a 
disruption after it has happened; and (4) recover—relating to activities focused on 
getting operations back to normal after a disruption has occurred.  
 
The MPRR framework was chosen as it matches the generic process of a rail 
disruption. Frameworks very similar to the MPRR framework have already been 
used to explore human factors (Wilson et al., 2006) and human-technology-
organisational perspectives of the PIDD system (Eklund, 2003) in similar ways to this 
study. Emergency response frameworks, such as the MPRR, help researchers to 
articulate knowledge and management of knowledge about disruptions (Jennex and 
Raman, 2009). The MPRR framework can be used on qualitative fuzzy-front-end 
systemic success factors, as found in the PIDD system, that are usually unforeseen 
and unpredictable, and have unknown resolutions and uncertain timeframes, 
properties which make it suitable for use in this study. 
 
The MPRR approach differs from other approaches that focus on quantitative 
planning models that typically try to optimise train service planning problems (e.g. 
D’Arano et al., 2008; Leibchen et al., 2010; Vansteenwegen and Van Oudheusen, 
2006), train positioning problems and train scheduling problems (e.g. Caimi et al., 
2012), which tend to be relatively easier to define and optimise. The contrast 
between quantitative scheduling optimisation problems and real-time customer-
frontline staff interaction-based problems, as focused on in this study, is recognised 
by Wilson et al. (2003). 
 
2.4 Data Collection 
 
This canonical action research project began by interviewing a cross section of key 
stakeholders: Managing Director, Passenger Service Director, Commercial Director, 
Finance Director, Duty Control Managers, Signal Controllers, frontline platform staff, 
a group of passengers, Train Schedule Planners, Social Media Managers, British 
Transport Police (BTP), and Network Rail’s (NR) Route Control Managers. These 
stakeholders helped to define the PIDD system under observation and produce an 
initial generic model of the PIDD system using the PrOH Modelling Methodology. 
 
Stakeholders also selected five contrasting incident types which were subsequently 
studied as they unfolded in real-time: train breakdown, points’ failures, power loss 
(two examples), fire and fatal accident (two examples). These case types later 
formed case studies within a case-study as per Voss’ case study principles (Voss 
2009). Types were selected to provide contrast and breadth to the study (as per 
Eisenhardt, 1989 and Yin, 1994). Seven cases were considered a parsimonious and 
“theoretically useful” (Voss, 2009, p.180) number for this study considering its 
boundaries and timeframes (Miles and Huberman, 1994) as they might “potentially 
produce contrary results for predictable reasons (e.g. a theoretical replication)” 
(Voss, 2009, p.172). These incident types are detailed in Section 4. 
Disruption types were each investigated using information gathered from interviews 
with key people involved in each incident, observations in real-time and use of 
incident-specific documentation (e.g. Network Rail-specific communication made via 
the Network Rail Tyrell information system, CR control logs, Area Director’s logs, 
Network Rail Route Control messages, and passenger satisfaction surveys) (similar 
to Glover, 2013). From each type of incident, the research team produced a detailed 
chronological timeline of events.  
The systemic properties of each incident type were then debated in a stakeholder 
workshop using a storyboarded version of the initial generic PrOH model together 
with the actual timelines (given in Section 3). During these workshops, 
 chronological timeline events were questioned; 
 systemic failings were highlighted by the PrOH model; and 
 academic frameworks which may potentially help to improve the PIDD 
system, and develop user requirements for a gamified learning environment, 
were posited and reflected upon. 
Reflecting on a priori frameworks in this manner is a key activity in abductive action 
research, as abductive reasoning is a process of logical inference starting with an 
observation and seeking to find a likely explanation—whereas, in scholarly action 
research, an academic framework is normally used to give the explanation. In this 
study, the most suitable abductive framework posited after investigating three 
incidents was the Mitigate, Prepare, Respond and Recover (MPRR) framework 
(Drabek, 1996; Fischer, 1998) (Section 2.3). Once validated as a fit-to-use 
framework, after two further incident investigations were applied to it, and through 
consultation with the train operating company experts, the MPRR framework was 
forthwith used as an academic reference framework for describing “when” 
gamification measures could be used, and for comparative benchmarks of CR’s 
practice to BTP’s and London Underground Ltd.’s (LUL) methods of dealing with 
disruptions, both of which are key organisations in this PIDD management system. 
This type of action research is referred to as abductive (Spens and Kovacs, 2006) 
because it supports reasoning from effect to causes or explanations (Lamma et al., 
1999). This study considers the PIDD management system as its system under 
observation or its puzzling observation or an anomaly that cannot be explained using 
established theory (Andreewsky and Bourcier, 2000) and uses the MPRR theoretical 
framework to provide a deliberate application of an alternative theory for explaining a 
phenomenon (Kirkeby, 1990) achieved via theory matching (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002). The use of abductive logic, by pattern matching to such an a priori framework, 
helps to induct new knowledge about the initial system under observation (e.g. the 
PIDD management system).  
 
Seven cycles of Canonical Action Research (CAR) took place as each incident was 
investigated as described below in Section 3. In effect, for this study, the CAR 
process is a two-stage investigation which (i) starts with an initial PrOH model 
produced from expert knowledge which was then (ii) iterated after each empirical 
case. Both steps are interdependent and iterative; however, the authors firstly 
present the overall PIDD system (Section 3) and then present the individual cases 
(Section 4) to define “what” should be gamified in the PIDD system. Toward the latter 
cycles of CAR the “how” (Section 5) and “when” (Section 6) conceptual requirement 
dimensions begin to emerge.     
 
 
3. THE PIDD SYSTEM 
 
A strategic view of the PIDD management system, shown as a holonic PrOH model, 
is given in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows strategic systemic interactions in the PIDD 
system; the PrOH model is used in a similar way to Tschirner’s mental model as both 
provide “The holistic view … to identify problems in the interplay of humans and 
technology in the complex organisational structure of railway traffic” (Tschirner, 
2014, Fig. 1, p.89). The PrOH model given in Figure 2 is the final version after seven 
iterations based investigation of each disruption. The main input to this PrOH model 
holon is “Disruptions” (top left-hand corner: green bubble). 
 
 Fig. 2. PrOH Model of the PIDD management System – ‘Duty Control Manager 
makes recovery Plans for PIDD’ 
 
The most significant role in this PIDD management system (see Figure 2) is that of 
“Disruption Solvers (not at scene)” which is placed in the red bubble in the centre of 
the model, which, surprisingly, was not a role formally identified in “normal” customer 
service (Customer Service Level 1 or CSL1) operating conditions. Primarily this role 
includes leadership from “Duty Control Managers (DCMs)” at stations, with 
significant support from “Duty Fleet Managers”, “Station Managers”, “Signallers”, 
“Network Rail Managers”, “Drivers” and “Crew”, “On-Call Managers” and “Other 
TOCs” who reciprocate supportive actions during disruptions. 
 
Another key role in this PIDD management system is the “Key Disruption Identifiers 
(at the scene)”, which surprisingly was also not a role recognised during normal 
operations, whether they be on the train (e.g. “Driver” or “Train Manager”) or off the 
train (e.g. “Maintenance” or “On-Call NR staff”). Often, problems are rooted in the 
fact that these temporarily recognised roles of “Disruption Solvers” and “Disruption 
Identifiers” are geographically separated, void of effective two-way communication, 
and reliant on information systems that are too slow to report on rapidly changing 
events that occur during a rail service disruption. The hiatus between “those at the 
scene” and those “not at the scene” is also recognised by Panou et al. (2014), 
Tschirner (2014), Golightly and Dadashi (2017) and Farrington-Darby et al. (2006) 
but not yet fully recognised or remedied by TOCs in practice.  
 
Another critical group in this PIDD management system includes the “Affected 
Passengers” who wait to have their train service rectified, rescheduled or transferred 
to “Other TOCs” in the event of a Customer Service Level 2 (CSL2) status being 
declared (CSL 2 is when CR tickets are useable on all other TOCs, or other forms of 
public transport, operating over the same network), or are provided with a “Non-train 
solution” (e.g. “Bus or Taxi”).  
 
Other significantly affected roles in this system are “Potential Passengers” who must 
be forewarned of any disruption so they can take proactive measures to minimise 
their own inconvenience and help prevent further exacerbation of the problem by 
entering into an already overloaded system.  
 
In periods of normal CSL1 operations, these roles have “Information Systems” and 
procedures fit for purpose. For instance the “DARWIN” information system is a 
“Network Rail” (NR) system used for planning and scheduling which connects all 
TOCs to NR, with a medium-to-long-term planning horizon (from hours to days). 
Tyrell, at the time of writing, is a one-way TOC industrywide system enabling “DCMs” 
to broadcast to other roles in the company. The choke point in the system comes as 
only DCMs (through a “Station Information Controller” [SIC]) can broadcast to all 
parties using the Tyrell system, and other roles have to communicate with the DCM 
using other alternative channels of communication to update the DCM of any 
changes to an unfolding situation. Messages of all types (e.g. phone, emails etc.) 
can easily run into hundreds per hour. Significantly, to be able to achieve a 
resolution to disruption that is both appropriate and timely, the DCM requires an 
accurate estimation of time to remove/fix the cause of the disruption; without this any 
planned response may be merely a ‘best guess’ based on past experience. Thus 
speedy and accurate communication of information is vital for effective response and 
recovery to provide an acceptable customer service level. This is because, as a 
disruption unfolds, the complexity of the system and deviations from a planned 
schedule can increase dramatically (Golightly and Dadashi, 2017). Communication 
channels also quickly become overloaded, and, to make matters worse, the DCM 
(through the SIC) cannot update the Tyrell system whilst taking incoming updates 
from these other channels; this phenomenon has also been observed by Kauppi et 
al. (2006).  
An “app” for mobile devices is provided free of charge by Chiltern Railways to update 
passengers in real-time for train positioning (based on the track section in which the 
train is currently located); however, additional information messages about delays 
and what to do are manually input based upon other Tyrell-formatted messages 
whose uniformity varies greatly. Often, it is the case that passengers and TOC 
operatives alike become informed about new disruption developments by other 
passengers using their publicly available social media (e.g. Twitter) before any 
official operational explanation reaches frontline staff, and, given that these unofficial 
messages cannot be taken as accurate, they add to the uncertainty and speculation 
between frontline staff and passengers on incidents, which can be a source of great 
frustration for all parties involved. As stated by Glover (2013, p.83), “It is most 
disconcerting for station staff in times of service disruption, when they are trying to 
do their best for passengers, to have someone come up and tell them more about 
the service than they themselves know”.  
“TMIS” is another real-time information system providing information on train position 
(by track sector) which can be assessed by those in offices (e.g. major signal boxes 
and control centres) but not by those on a train or at the scene of an accident. There 
are also many other passenger/customer information systems (e.g. “JASMIN” and 
“KELNFORM+”) which play a significant role in PIDD management system, but fall 
out of the scope of this particular study.  
Local tacit knowledge of TOC’s frontline staff on other transport systems located 
near a railway station also plays an important part in the PIDD system (Figure 2) 
which, depending on its accuracy, either helps or hinders the PIDD system. The 
effectiveness of this knowledge is largely dependent on the competence, confidence 
and experience of TOC frontline staff, thus making the need for gamified learning 
initiatives for PIDD management timely, relevant and important (Abdelatif et al., 
2015). 
Presently, those most in need of up-to-date information, in other words those 
“Disruption Solvers” (not at the incident scene), don’t get it, as “Train Drivers” cannot 
use a phone whilst driving, “Train Crew” don’t have access to Tyrell, Internet-based 
systems have only weak coverage in rural areas and electrified rail track areas, and 
there is no coverage in tunnels where incidents commonly occur. Thus, TOC 
frontline staff “not at the scene” are reliant on calls made on two-way radio 
messages by “Drivers” that are only possible when trains are stationary, which is 
seldom the case. Alternatively, calls can be made by the “Online Train Crew” whilst 
the train is moving, as they are able to receive a communication signal from the 
signallers in signal box who are informed directly about a situation, which is more 
common. Neither scenario is ideal as information of this form will be partial and not 
fully contextualised (Panou, et al., 2014). Likewise, signal boxes will only have up-to-
date information about an incident if the incident is very local or the Network Rail 
Mobile Operations Manager (MOM), or a TOC DCM in the control centre has been 
able to update the “Signallers”. Non-Tyrell messages in the PIDD management 
system are also asynchronous with Tyrell and may not be exactly the same or 
received at the same time as Tyrell messages. Hence, official messages may be 
different than the social media messages received by passengers. Herein lies the 
root of confusions and delays in the PIDD management system, which contribute to 
high customer dissatisfaction. These systemic success factors are all depicted by the 
interlinking sentence descriptions in the PrOH model given in Fig. 2, as just 
described.  
Therefore, in times of disruption, the PIDD management system has systemic 
failures, due to a combination of ill-defined roles, inappropriate operating procedures, 
misused information system functions, information-overload, asynchronous 
processes and unchecked human behaviour. Indeed, some studies in other 
companies have even reported that some operational systems are so problematic 
during disruption that they get turned off to prevent confusion (Balfe et al., 2012). So 
the same resources which are sufficient in times of normal operations (i.e. CSL1) 
cannot respond adequately, in the opinion of passengers, in times of disruption. The 
holonic model of the systemic success factors in the PIDD management system (Fig. 
2) is therefore akin to an evaporable cloud of systemic problems created by a 
disruption which then vanishes during the last two phases of MPRR. Researchers 
have not previously attempted to fully capture and study these nefarious systemic 
success factors because recording them is usually too difficult and the last thing on 
the minds of a PIDD team during an actual incident (i.e. CSL2 conditions).  
 
Capturing such systemic PIDD behaviour is challenging but it has been achieved in 
part by this study through prescient generic soft systems modelling activities followed 
by real-time observation of seven disruptions (data for the PrOH model of the PIDD 
management system in Fig. 2). Fig. 2 also reveals some of the systemic success 
factors for making “Recovery Plans”—the main outcome of the PIDD management 
system.  
 
 
4.  INCIDENCES OF DISRUPTION – “WHAT” TO GAMIFY 
 
Five incident types illustrate the main types of CSL2 disruptions which occur 
(adapted from Glover, 2013) (see green ‘artefact’ input bubble in the left hand corner 
of the PrOH model in Fig. 2). For brevity, only the most relevant idiosyncrasies of 
each type of disruption are time-lined and discussed in this paper. Similar issues and 
scenarios have been reported by Kauppi et al. (2006) in Sweden. Whilst timelines 
given in this study are simplifications of reality, care has been taken to retain salient 
properties to demonstrate authenticity and fidelity (as endorsed by van Lankveld et 
al., 2017); Appendixes 1 and 2 should be referred to for locations and UK-specific 
rail term explanations.  
 
4.1 Train breakdown 
 
This incident type is illustrated using the events during a freight train failure at 
Gerrards Cross on the afternoon of February 12th 2014 and the impact upon CR’s 
services. The train initially came to a standstill on the main line at 15:00hrs and was 
declared a failure by the driver at 15:15. At 15:52, locomotive 66160, hauling a 
goods train, was identified as a suitable rescue locomotive and was held at High 
Wycombe station. However, due to the sensitive (military) nature of the cargo pulled 
by locomotive 66160, one platform at High Wycombe had to be closed to the public 
and it was necessary to source a member of British Transport Police (BTP) to secure 
the wagons left on the running line. Further confusion arose over where was the best 
place to remove the failed train. Eventually, a decision was made to recover it to 
Aylesbury, which in turn trapped two diverted Birmingham trains and further affected 
both the passengers on board and CR’s overall service recovery. The incident was 
closed at 22:54, by which time a significant number of trains had been fully or 
partially cancelled and those which had run had been subject to severe 
overcrowding. Further details of this incident are given in the timeline in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Timeline for failed freight train. 
 
The overall reflective consensus of the PIDD team was that the management of this 
incident was “good” with some areas for improvement. The problems were caused 
by constant slippage of estimated recovery times due to initial misdiagnosis of the 
disruption and subsequent iterations and re-iterations of recovery plans. The overall 
timescale between the incident being declared to NR and the broken-down freight 
train being moved was eventually 2 hours and 33 minutes. This relatively lengthy 
time, bordering on a major incident, was due to having to obtain a suitably rated 
recovery engine from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), an external agency. Had an 
alternative recovery engine with an adequate hauling rating been available, then the 
recovery time and the return to normal operation could have been faster. Customer 
advice and communications and the formalisation of a prioritised plan were initially 
hindered by high uncertainty. The uncertainty caused high-loading of phone calls to 
Chiltern Railways Control (CRCL) which caused further delays to a mid-term 
solution. On the positive side, CSL2 was declared swiftly, and alternative routes and 
road transportation were available for this location.   
 
4.2 Points failure 
 
This incident type is illustrated by a point’s failure at Marylebone (MYB) on the 
morning of 6th February 2014. The early morning timing of the incident meant that 
some key TOC PIDD team members were themselves caught in the disruption as 
they made their way to work. This contributed to a shortage of experienced staff, 
both in terms of their presence on the station and their ability to contribute to decisive 
and effective decision-making as communicating with them was difficult. The rail 
points in question (no.ME813) were critical to providing a basic service, and the 
ensuing reduced service meant that passengers were left behind on the platform. 
The failure was exacerbated by industrial action by members of the Rail, Maritime 
and Transport (RMT) Union which diminished the services of London Underground 
Ltd. (LUL) as the normal response was to shift passengers to LUL. Delays in 
understanding the root cause of the problem led to inaccurate forecasts for clearing 
the disruption, which in turn created anxiety and frustration in passengers. Further 
details of this incident’s timeline are given in Fig. 4. 
 
 Fig. 4. Timeline for points failure. 
 
The reflective consensus of those involved was that the overall management of the 
incident was that it was “adequately handled” but had possible areas for 
improvement which could have reduced the extended fault-finding period (NR 
responsibility) and increased the amount of recovery options available. The overall 
timescale between the incident occurring and normal working practice being restored 
was 4 hours and 10 minutes—in other words, a “major delay”. Access to Platforms 1 
and 2 and limited train movements were restored after 42 minutes. The delay for 
completely resolving the incident was due to the intermittent nature of the failure 
which made the identification of the root-cause more difficult. Noted areas for 
improvement in this incident related to having higher staff skill levels and clearer 
operating procedures to increase the clarity of information shared. For instance, the 
efficiency and speed of communication could have been improved and more 
consistent messages could have been communicated across information systems, 
especially those messages given through Tyrell. More could also have been done to 
inform the public of other available sources of service information.  
 
 
 
 
4.3 Fatalities 
 
This incident type is illustrated by two occurrences: one at Mantleswood on Tuesday 
February 4th 2014 and one at Willesden Green during the evening of Wednesday 
12th November 2013. Both incidents occurred during the evening peak, meaning that 
stations and train services were at their busiest. In both incidents, once British 
Transport Police (BTP) had established there were no suspicious circumstances 
(e.g. murder or gross negligence) and no ensuing criminal investigations (which BTP 
aim to do in a one-hour service-level target) were required, the recovery plans and 
duration were able to be declared with greater certainty. See Fig. 5 and 6 for further 
details on these incidents’ timelines. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Timeline for fatality (Mantleswood). 
 
 Fig. 6. Timeline for fatality (Willesden Green) 
 
Ironically, despite the fatal nature of these incidents, the recovery timelines were 
quite predicable, which helped staff to quickly provide information that had a high 
degree of certainty to passengers. Declaration of CSL2 was swiftly declared, which 
helped prevent the PIDD management system from becoming too overloaded. Quick 
recovery was also helped by rapid response from the BTP in both cases. However, 
in the case of the Willesden Green incident, resuming normal service was hindered 
slightly because the track where the incident happened was under the jurisdiction of 
LUL—and not NR; therefore, updates about infrastructure changes were slower than 
normal to trickle through the PIDD management system.  
 
4.4 Loss of power  
 
This incident type is illustrated by a loss of power in the Banbury area during the 
evening of Wednesday 12th February 2014, and by a loss of power in the Princes 
Risborough area during the afternoon and evening of Sunday 17th August 2014.  
 
In the first instance, a fault with the high-voltage overhead cables (responsibility of 
Western Power Distribution) led to a power cut, affecting over 2,000 properties in the 
Banbury area, including Banbury station itself. It also resulted in the loss of all 
signalling around the Banbury and Aynho junctions. The incident occurred during a 
period of severe weather which had already contributed to disruptions across the rail 
network and had already put additional pressure on road transport. Power was 
restored to the majority of the affected properties after around 75 minutes, but further 
problems with the signalling equipment meant that disruption to train services 
continued for several hours afterwards. The incident was characterised by poor 
provision of information to customers as only generic advice was offered, and, in 
some cases, there were gaps greater than one hour between passenger information 
updates. To make matters worse, the power loss also affected some electronic rail 
information systems which were normally used to inform passengers about rail 
disruptions. 
 
In the second incident, an external UK power network cable fault caused loss of 
power to the signalling between Bicester and Princes Risborough shortly before 
14:00 hours. It was recognised relatively quickly that this problem was not likely to be 
resolved easily, and this fact was conveyed to passengers. However, the situation 
was further complicated by the planned closure of the West Coast Main Line for 
engineering works. This meant that passengers travelling between London and the 
West Midlands, who were already subject to travel disruption, were now affected by 
two different separate major incidents. Managing passengers at Princes Risborough 
became a major problem, with the sheer volume of passengers making it difficult to 
load and embark replacement bus services, and it was too difficult for frontline CR 
staff to make themselves heard when travel advice was issued to passengers. The 
last hour of this incident was characterised by particularly poor communication 
between stakeholders which resulted in passengers being given little information, 
some of which was also misleading, about when services might resume. The 
detailed timelines for these incidents are given in Fig. 7 and 8.  
 
 Fig. 7. Power failure (Banbury) 
 
Fig. 8. Power failure (Princes Risborough) 
The general perception was that the incident affecting Banbury was poorly managed 
with very little useful information being communicated; moreover, failure of the back-
up infrastructure and poor communication between geographically remote sites 
further exacerbated the incident. The management of the Princes Risborough 
incident was considered as “relatively good” except that normal CSL1 working was 
expected to be resumed at approximately 18:15 hours; however, poor 
communication resulted in confusion (e.g. incorrect passenger information) and a 
delayed reinstatement of CSL1. Unfortunately, customer service feedback rated this 
incident as “poor”. 
 
 
4.5 Cable fire in tunnel 
 
This incident describes the protracted events involved following a cable fire in the 
tunnel at St. John’s Wood. The incident was discovered in the early hours of Sunday 
morning June 15th 2014 and resulted in the closure of Marylebone station until the 
morning of Tuesday 17th June 2014. The timeline of this incident is extensive as the 
incident stretched over three days; see Fig. 9a, 9b and 9c. Initially, this incident was 
reported as a “minor incident” as it was believed that just a single two-metre stretch 
of cable had burnt out. However, in fact, once the fire had been extinguished and the 
damage had been fully assessed, it turned out that 30 cables needed to be replaced 
in and around a cabling junction box which meant total closure of the tunnel was 
necessary whilst complex repairs were carried out by NR. During the early stages of 
this incident, engineering works were constantly affecting the react and recovery 
timeline which was extended from “minor” to “major” as critical damage was revealed 
piece-by-piece over time. BTP and the Fire Service also had to investigate the scene 
to ensure that arson hadn’t been committed, which was a possible further 
complication. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9(a). Fire in St. John’s Wood Tunnel. 
 
 
Fig. 9(b). Fire in St. John’s Wood Tunnel. 
 Fig. 9(c). Fire in St. John’s Wood Tunnel. 
 
On reflection, the general perception was that the incident could have been 
managed more effectively in the initial stages while the extent of the problem was not 
fully understood. Later on during the incident, the management of the incident 
became far more effectively managed once a more accurate estimate for repairs was 
apparent. In this case, the provision of customer information was considered to be 
handled “reasonably well” by passengers. Moreover, it was just fortunate that the 
incident had occurred on a Sunday morning when there was relatively little 
passenger traffic, and demand and capacity planning for the following Monday 
morning’s commuter service could be re-planned fairly effectively in time. Also, once 
it was certain that the Marylebone station would have to be shut for a substantial 
period of time, rail services running from some Marylebone platforms were 
significantly and quickly rescheduled to run from other platforms, across other 
infrastructure (e.g. London Underground and London Overground), or from other 
nearby stations just beyond the outward-bound end of the tunnel from the 
Marylebone Station terminus.  
 
It is therefore desirable to be able quickly to understand the severity and uncertainty 
levels of such incidents. Being able to do so meant that no short-term solution to the 
tunnel fire would be possible, and a “major” cancelling and rescheduling of services 
from the mid-to-long term had to be implemented immediately. In hindsight, 
passengers felt that “adequate” advice had been given to this effect and service 
levels had been acceptable considering what had happened.  
 
Of all the incidents studied in this project, this tunnel fire case was by far the most 
extensive, complex and time consuming to resolve. It was however coped with 
remarkably competently by the TOC staff because “normal” PIDD recovery 
procedures, which are too slow to react to even “minor” disruptions (e.g. by using 
Tyrell and TMIS in CR, and DARWIN in NR linking to other TOCS), couldn’t be used 
at all in this “major” disruption. 
 
Across each incident, the generic systemic success factors were coded (King, 2004) 
into a repertory template given in Table 1 (in a similar way to Golightly and Dadashi’s 
[2017] classification of incident types). These systemic success factors were 
common to all cases and show “what” should be addressed by a gamified capability 
of improving the PIDD management system. Red cells show areas for improvement, 
green cells show examples of good practice and white cells show satisfactory 
performance. Overall, the high proportion of red cells suggests that there is a strong 
need for developing a new learning capability to help improve the quality of customer 
service provision during rail disruptions. 
Table 1  
Repertory template showing ‘what’ systemic success factors to address across investigated case Incidents 
 Incident Type 
Systemic success factors - from analyses of specific 
disruptive incidents 
Train 
Breakdown 
Points 
Failure 
Fatality 
(M’wood) 
Fatality 
(W’Grn) 
Fire 
Power 
Loss (Ban) 
Power Loss 
(PRR) 
 Improve resolution estimates (slippage)    x2 x3 x2 x3 
Better definition of disruption (normal working (CSL1) vs end of 
disruption to customers) 
x2    x2   
Better management of external agencies x3  
x2 (plus 1 
good) 
 x2 x3  
Clearer notification of alternative routes for passengers x2  x3 
x2 (plus 
x1 good) 
x2 x2 x4 
More consistent message formatting in Tyrell  x2   x3 x2  
Better customer advice x2 x3 x2  
x2 (plus 
x1 weak)  
x2 x3 
Communication of prioritised plans & control intent x2      x2 (+ x2 good) 
Quicker provision of more suitable road transport alternatives x2  x2 
x2 (plus 
x1 weak) 
 x2  
Consistent messages throughout PIDD management system  x4    x2 x3 
Clear and timely identification of the problem / disruption     x2 x2  
Improve staff confidence to give CSL2 declaration  x2      
Limit calls to Control (even loading)        
Better forecasting of medium-term potential consequences     x4 x2 x2 (+ 1 good) 
Mitigate criticality of incident timing (resourcing)  x3   x2   
Increase number of limited alternatives (including disruption on 
other services) 
       
More information availability to customers x2    x2 x3 x3 
Increase knowledge about geographic criticality of incidents      x2  
Enhanced co-ordination of response      x2  
Better manage extending timeframe and escalating problems / 
difficulty  
      
Better manage information overload (comprehension and 
communication)  
      
Better integration of information systems 
 
      
 
Key to cells: Green = predominantly good. Red = predominantly weak. Frequencies (e.g. x2) show where systemic success factor occurred more than once. 
5. LEARNING ABOUT THE PIDD SYSTEM – “HOW” TO GAMIFY 
 
While Table 1 shows a repertory of ‘what’ systemic success factors need to be 
addressed by a gamified capability to improve the PIDD system, a gamified 
capability for learning about the PIDD management process should also consider 
“how” gamification could be done. We propose that a gamified approach should: 
 allow disruptions to be worked through in a safe environment and use a time-
lined scenario; 
 build understanding about a specific scenario; 
 use a systemic process of some kind to represent the systemic success 
factors within the PIDD system; and 
 facilitate interaction between frontline staff and passengers.  
Particular attention should be given to the following aspects of “how’ a gamified 
approach could work.  
 
5.1 Develop heuristic decision-making 
 
The nature of the PIDD system means that limited opportunities exist to see how 
incidents develop over the medium-to-long term, especially as they become 
unforeseeably and increasingly extended (Törnquist, 2007) and are often 
overwhelmingly combinatorically complex. However, “Disruption Solvers” are always 
under great pressure to solve problems more quickly and effectively, so it is useful to 
have heuristic rules and guidelines to aid cognition. 
 
We have found from this study that there is an intuitive and critical one-to-two hour 
“pacification window” within which “minor” incidents can be rectified, as passengers 
are willing to tolerate delay to some extent before normal services resume. But 
beyond two hours, as experienced in more “major” incidents, passengers no longer 
seem prepared to wait and want viable alternatives arrangements to be made. 
Beyond two hours, staff can also become compromised by legal working-time 
directives which have knock-on effects to the next shift and next peak demand 
period. Likewise, rolling-stock and engines also become too displaced for normal 
operations to resume without significantly re-planning rail services. As more major 
incidents are likely to increase the involvement of external agencies in the latter react 
and recovery phases of MPRR, use of shared ideals and group-based heuristics 
becomes more significant.  
 
We recommend that any gamified PIDD learning environment should improve 
heuristic decision making to give “Disruption Solvers”, especially in group-based 
scenarios, a means to record and reflect upon systemic success factors which are 
too complex to be fully considered during the unfolding of an actual disruption. The 
challenge is that “Disruption Solvers” need to capture and understand the cloud of 
evaporating problems created by an incident. The problem for learning about this 
cloud is that it only exists during a disruption, and, once the disruption has been 
solved and normal service resumes, the cloud of problems vanishes along with any 
associated learning opportunities. This study has captured some of the systemic 
success factors by using a mixture of incident timelines (as in Section 4) and holonic 
thinking (as shown in Fig. 2). This study recommends that other gamification 
developers should do something similar. 
 
5.2 Perform reviews of analysis  
 
The impact of practice, both weak and good, should be recorded in an accessible 
format on an incident-by-incident basis using operational data (e.g. Passenger 
Information Surveys). Reviews of practice across all incident types should also be 
conducted periodically (e.g. monthly or quarterly) to detect preventable 
reoccurrences and identify areas of potential improvement. This research showed 
that good practice is achievable in almost all systemic success factors but was 
hampered by inconsistency. Reviews should aim to embed a culture of continuous 
improvement in the organisation that involves operational frontline staff, passengers 
and senior management and recognise and reward those accordingly for positive 
action.  
 
We recommend that a gamified PIDD learning environment should have periodic 
meetings instigated where incidences are played out (i.e. gamified) to help redefine 
strategic priorities and improvement objectives, give guidance to operational staff 
and deliver a process in which TOCs can (re)define and track a PIDD management 
system’s performance over time. Reviews could also bring in good practice from 
other related sectors (e.g. air traffic control, military, emergency service, logistics 
etc.) to reflect upon other extant emergency preparedness models. 
 
5.3 Standardise operating procedures 
 
This research revealed that some systemic success factors were well managed and 
others were less well managed. Thus, the potential capability exists within CR to 
perform MPRR to a satisfactory level—subject to standard operating procedures 
being known better and used more consistently.  
 
We recommend that a gamified learning environment should facilitate reviews of 
standard procedures to re-approve and reinforce good practice, improve ineffective 
practice and determine when new practices are required. The benefit of this would 
be two-fold: firstly, a consistent and reliable response could be expected for 
disruptive incidents, and, secondly, deviations from standard procedures can be 
investigated in associated reviews of analysis. An examination of standard operating 
procedures should cover job role definitions, authority, autonomy and reporting 
hierarchy, and they should include a critique of critical systemic interfaces of other 
external agencies (e.g. other TOCs, NR and BTP). 
 
5.4 Engage staff in ongoing development 
 
In having defined, appropriate and clear processes for the PIDD management 
system, it is also necessary to ensure that all staff are capable of performing them. 
Such capability includes leadership of team performances in crisis situations, and 
individuals being able to carry out their own individual responsibilities in “normal” 
(CSL 1) working conditions and “disrupted” (CSL 2) working conditions. Essential 
and desirable skill gaps, current and future, should also be identified; this research 
shows that it would be beneficial for a TOC to include: 
 more effective use of messaging systems (e.g. Tyrell) 
 more effective disruption prognostics 
 increased familiarity with current operating procedures 
 more knowledge on critical skills (e.g. train planning and DCM succession) 
 more knowledge about where staff live in proximity to their rail network’s 
pinch-points. 
We recommend that a gamified PIDD learning environment should be embedded 
into an on-going programme of staff development and improvement processes that 
address the effective use of procedures and information systems (e.g. complete and 
consistent messaging through Tyrell) based around incident scenarios and problem-
based learning approaches for typical incidents such as those featured in this paper. 
These steps would be ideal for succession planning with existing staff and 
apprenticeship / induction style training for newer staff, as well as for increasing 
knowledge levels in staff to be able to provide higher levels of customer service 
quality during disruptions (Jade et al., 2015). 
 
5.5 Scan for new technology 
 
This research revealed that information systems were not as unfit for purpose as 
some CR managers originally thought, as key information systems seemed to be 
sufficiently integrated but not utilised fully in terms of their functionality. Also, quite 
surprisingly, only a small number of passengers were found to use social media. For 
instance, Twitter was used by only 4–6% of passengers (in 2014), and, because 
tweets from passengers cannot be fed automatically into official CR / NR systems, 
the immediacy and impact of officially endorsed social media is still currently limited. 
However, more live feeds should be implemented as official use of social media by 
TOCs are likely to grow rapidly. 
 
We recommend that a gamified PIDD learning environment should allow users to 
recommend new technologies to help passengers and staff become better informed 
during disruptions. To do this requires infrastructure (such as on-track wireless 
coverage), communication devices for drivers (such as hands-free, voice-operated 
systems), on-board information screens for passengers (as seen in mainland 
Europe), on- and off-board cameras and GPS tracking to be installed. Upgrading of 
location-specific messaging at stations and at frequent points of disruptions should 
also be considered; other similar such suggestions are made by Panou et al. (2014).  
 
5.6 Develop more effective customer information channels  
 
This research also revealed a need to increasingly focus on customers’ requirements 
and make more information more available to passengers in real-time. However, 
there should be less emphasis on pushing large volumes of generic information to 
passengers and greater emphasis on narrow-casting messages or mass-
customisation of messages based on passengers’ personal requests and locations. 
For instance, some passengers prefer a “do-it-yourself” approach for their travel 
arrangements so as long as that they have access to the suitable information 
sources (via the Internet); this may be the most suitable approach when all TOCS 
are affected by the same disruption and CSL2 ticket acceptance conditions are 
ineffective. Other passengers may prefer TOCs to arrange their onward journeys 
using a more general ‘any other reasonable route’ approach; this is often based on 
TOC employees’ tacit knowledge about station hinterlands, especially when a 
specific TOC is affected. Alternatively, other passenger types, such as First Class 
travellers, may prefer an automatic “get me home” facility via a mobile device 
application or a concierge-type service. The key point is that different options need to 
be provided for different types of passengers in different scenarios, rather than using 
a one-size-fits-all approach to messaging. 
 
We recommend that a gamified PIDD learning environment should allow users (e.g. 
frontline staff) to seek advice through different types of information provision during a 
disruption and consider how best to take appropriate actions, and experiment to see 
if these should vary with different types of customer and/or with different types of 
disruption (similar to Abdelatif, 2015). It is also important to recognise that 
disruptions can be dealt with in more than one way, and, by contextualising problem-
based experiential learning in this way, it is likely that better quality learning will be 
generated than by mandating prescriptive rules for disruptions management (Kauppi 
et al., 2012).  
 
 
6. ABDUCTIVE RATIONALIZATION USING THE MPRR 
FRAMEWORK – “WHEN” TO GAMIFY 
 
As with any TOC, CR is part of a larger complex customer service provision system, 
and is often disrupted by things completely outside of their control (Vromans et al., 
2006). However, TOCs are expected to react and recover from situations within short 
timelines and tight constraints whilst working with many different external 
stakeholders.  
 
Reaction and recovery (of MPRR) is made difficult for TOCs by having limited input 
into the earlier mitigation and planning of the PIDD system, as mitigation and 
planning fall mainly under the jurisdictions of NR and the BTP. Therefore, a third 
dimension of conceptual gamification specifications, in addition to “what” and ‘how” 
must be considered, and that is “when” each action should be most effectively used 
in MPRR, as done in a QFD level 2 type analysis (see Clegg and Tan, 2007). For 
similar reasons, Chu and Oetting (2013) also only focus on developing heuristic 
disruption programmes for the react and recovery phase of the disruption, but 
notably only focus only on the positioning of rolling stock in the network, as they 
state that modelling and optimising dynamic changes for human factors are too 
complex.   
 
6.1 Mitigation  
 
Mitigation includes actions such as fencing-off track to prevent incidents involving the 
public, and track and signalling maintenance from NR. BTP also have an active 
presence at accident black spots by installing CCTV and extra safety precautions. 
The locomotive and rolling-stock owners will also be responsible for maintaining the 
fleet and mitigating any associated failures. Standard operating procedures (SOPs), 
new technology and performance analysis reviews play important roles in defining 
when each act of mitigation should be undertaken. 
 
This research recommends that forming more effective on-going working 
relationships with external agencies such as NR, BTP, utility providers, bus 
companies, transportation, police, ambulance and transport agencies should be 
encouraged by any gamified learning environment. At the same time, it would be 
helpful to prepare more suitable communication channels for consistent messaging 
in the initial mitigation stage of MPRR.   
 
6.2 Preparedness  
 
Much preparation activity falls under the jurisdiction of the NR with responsibility for 
track infrastructure. Thus, gamification requirements for preparedness of a TOC 
should be focused on their employees: crew scheduling (Ceder et al., 2015), front-
line platform staff, passengers and supporting systems. Herein lies the scope for 
improvement inspired by the professional emergency services. For instance, UK 
emergency services will have a “Gold”, “Silver” and “Bronze” command and control 
hierarchy (HMSO, 2013) where “Gold Command” is strategic and maintains an 
objective stance, and is often deliberately geographically remote from the incident. 
“Silver Command” (normally identified by a person donning a high-visibility silvered 
jacket) will be extra tactical resource, whose sole role it becomes to co-ordinate the 
disruption response and recovery. Meanwhile, “Bronze Control” will be the everyday 
operational manager on the ground who has an eye on trying to sustain normality 
during a disruption. In comparison, this study’s equivalence of a “Silver Command” 
was ambiguous, requiring more support from appropriate technology, process, 
procedures and training. Silver Command has, in these cases, been ambiguously 
fulfilled by a group of people consisting of NR’s Mobile Operations Managers 
(MOMs) and TOC’s DCMs and SIOs liaising with CRCL, with no singularity of 
authority and whose use of multifarious systems to transmit messages has been too 
loose. This study shows that the Silver Command equivalence has been relatively 
nebulous, so designing purpose-made staff development has been difficult. This has 
contributed to passengers’ dissatisfaction about service levels during disruptions.  
 
So, unlike the full-time emergency services which have a planned “fire-break” 
between defined reporting hierarchy levels during disruptive events, TOCs’ relatively 
disparate approach to disruption management creates an undesirable division 
between the “Disruption Identifiers” and “Disruption Solvers” (as shown in the PIDD 
PrOH model in Fig. 2) which is caused by misused information systems, and 
processes and procedures which are less than completely fit-for-purpose. Whilst the 
full-time emergency services think of “get track clear”, TOCs think of “get trains 
moving as scheduled”. In actual fact, they should both think together with more 
customer focus to “get passengers to where they want to be”—with the highest 
possible health and safety levels in mind—as quicker and safer disruption 
resolutions are likely to be associated with higher customer satisfaction rates.  
 
This study recommends that a gamified learning approach for PIDD should be 
developed to help to prepare frontline staff for disruption and help them adopt and 
develop better “command and control” management for disruptions on both an 
individual personal basis and a systemic organisational level; these could occur 
within gamified company improvement initiatives. 
 
6.3 Responsiveness 
 
Responsiveness is what the full-time emergency services excel at, so, during a PIDD 
response, an “expert” incident response person, such as a Silver Commander, 
should take control to co-ordinate the extraordinary activities and report upwards to 
the Gold Command (in the TOC’s control room). This leaves the “Bronze Manager” 
to focus on managing normal (i.e. CSL1) operations, allowing backfilling with extra 
local resource as necessary. After health and safety requirements have been 
fulfilled, the priority for TOCs at this stage should be to get passengers to their 
destinations as swiftly as possible. Ideally, all incident-related communications 
should go through the designated Silver Command, who should take a longer-term 
view on the overall recovery of the situation, which, in turn, should free up time for 
the Bronze Manager to be more present in frontline response activities.  
 Ideally, the Silver Commander will also have two-way communications in real-time 
(including video) linking them with other key people across the incident response 
team. Silver Command will then be in a situation to give accurate estimates on 
recovery actions and lead-times. In between incidents, when not so busy, the Silver 
Commander should assist with mitigation (e.g. training) and preparedness activities 
and become a full-time PIDD MPRR expert. Metrics on lapsed time against 
estimates and observed behaviours during CSL2 should also be routinely recorded 
by the Silver Commander role, capturing characteristics of disruptions and their 
vanishing cloud of problems to inform future PIDD management systems and 
gamification of related learning scenarios. 
 
Good practice shows that the source of any PIDD-related message, whether cast by 
Gold-, Silver- or Bronze-type roles, should be trustworthy, and the message must be 
informative, targeted and cast through the most effective channel used by its 
intended audience in a language and style that the audiences will be most receptive 
to. Communication to the public is a key part of any response plan by these roles 
and should not be left to chance, especially in cases of rail disruptions where TOC 
disruptions management teams are not co-located. 
 
6.4 Recovery  
 
Recovery is the most visible part of MPRR as passengers and frontline staff are 
inseparably involved. The recovery phase begins when the cause of a problem has 
been solved and has been declared as “solved” to passengers, but its effects are still 
being felt for an indefinite period afterwards. These CR cases also show that new 
systems and devices used to track the whereabouts of key resources during 
disruption (especially for key staff, engines, rolling-stock and infrastructure affecting 
the PIDD management system) would be useful, but the key to this phase’s success 
is still likely to lie in the tacit skill and knowledge levels of frontline staff. Thus, ideally 
at the end of this recovery stage, the operating authority should be handed back to 
the Bronze (normal operations) Manager and a simultaneous “hot brief” fed back to 
the incident response team about key actions and performance metrics.  
 
A gamified learning approach for PIDD should allow players to debate and play-out 
alternate courses of action in a group to experiment what works best for the 
customer as this phase is characterised by much passenger frustration. As such, the 
expectations of customers need to be carefully managed through constant liaison 
with other TOCs (in CSL2) and transport operators providing replacement services to 
clear the backlog of re-routed passengers; moreover, alternative routes and 
information should also be clearly made available to passengers. Quality and 
timeliness of messaging to passengers at this stage is very sensitive and closely 
linked to how customers perceive the quality of service and the feedback they give 
afterwards.  
  
 
7. CONCLUSION  
 
The overall aim of the MPRR (Mitigate-Plan-React-Recover) framework in this 
context should be to simultaneously reduce operational costs for a train-operating 
company (TOC) whilst increasing its customers’ satisfaction rates through better use 
of information by frontline staff during disruptions. 
 
This action research project has used Canonical Action Research (CAR) to 
investigate systemic issues in the PIDD (Passenger Information During Disruption) 
management system. PrOH modelling created an initial holon of the PIDD system 
which was prescient in facilitating discussions in workshops about linearity (using 
timelines) versus systemicity (using the PrOH model) to explore systemic success 
factors and information-provision deficiencies inherent in the PIDD management 
system. Seven real-time incidents (five types) over an 18-month period were 
observed. 
 
The outcomes consist of three dimensions of a conceptual design specification for a 
gamified learning environment to improve customer service in times of disruption. 
The conceptual design is defined in one dimension by the 21 systemic success 
factors common to all seven incidents by stating “what” should be addressed in the 
gamified learning capability (as summarised in the repertory template in Table 2, 
Section 4). In the second dimension, the conceptual design is defined by six design 
criteria recommendations which define “how” a gamified learning capability could 
address these systemic success factors (which are given in Section 5). The third 
conceptual design dimension is defined through abductive reasoning to the MPRR 
reference framework which highlights “when” actions by frontline staff are most 
suitably gamified (as discussed in Section 6).  
 
Presently, opportunities for learning about PIDD management systems are limited as 
its “vanishing cloud” of systemic problems is only apparent at the critical periods of 
react and recover, and are seldom captured. Once a disruption is solved and the 
cloud of problems has evaporated, the associated learning opportunities are also 
lost; so too are the impetuses and creativity to build new learning capabilities and/or 
serious learning games to gamify the process to improve the PIDD system. This 
research has captured these parsimoniously at a conceptual level for other 
researchers, train operating companies and serious game developers to build upon 
(Tschriner et al., 2014) without oversimplifying the challenges in disruptions 
management (Feltovich et al., 2004). These conceptual design requirements are 
sensitive to socio-technical systemic problems and consider that learning capabilities 
and/or gamifying solutions may be technical and/or non-technical; computer-based 
and/or manual paper-based (as called for by Meijer, 2012) and may use a mix of 
optimisation and soft improvement measures.    
The challenge now remains to develop a prototype gamified learning capability to 
improve the PIDD management system based on these conceptual requirements. 
Any such capabilities should take steps to increase the certainty and confidence of 
frontline staff’s decision-making ability, reduce the lead-times of decision making in 
the PIDD management system and ultimately improve customer satisfaction rates in 
rail services. These steps would help meet current widespread concerns of national 
governments and rail regulators (EU, 2011) and improve the quality of rail services, 
especially during disruptions, and reduce user costs. It is hoped that these 
conceptual requirements will lead to the development of realistic verisimilar holistic 
and heuristic learning capabilities symbolic of socio-technical factors as discussed in 
this paper (i.e. the PIDD socio-technical system) (as per Dormans, 2011; Myers, 
1999). 
 
This study is limited as it is currently only based on findings from one train-operating 
company in Great Britain. However, by taking a range of typical cases, using a 
typical train-operating company and embedding this action research in a wider body 
of knowledge from rail customer service and emergency response, we believe that 
the proposed conceptual design requirements are transferable to other similar TOCs 
in other similar countries or services (e.g. bus and air travel).   
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Appendix 1: Map of CR’s network 
 
Appendix 2: Glossary of Rail-Specific Terms 
 
Key Term Definition / Brief Explanation 
AMS Station code for Amersham 
Area Director A Network Rail role in charge of a large geographical area of rail 
network 
ATP Automatic Train Protection 
Aynho Junction A rail junction between Banbury and High Wycombe (Aynho is just 
south of Banbury Station) 
BAN Station code for Banbury 
BCS Station code for Bicester North  
Black Service No trains running on a region of the rail network 
British Transport Police (BTP) An independent police force for the whole network  
Control log Records of incidents and actions 
CRCL Chiltern Railways Company Ltd. 
Crew / Train Crew / on board 
train crew 
Train-operating employees on board trains 
CSL1 (Green / Yellow Service) Normal undisrupted service or very minor disruptions 
CSL2 (Red Service) Major disruptions which cause noticeable delays for passengers 
DARWIN A Network Rail information system used to plan and schedule all 
train-operating companies’ operations  
DfT – Department for 
Transport 
A UK government department responsible for travel policy and 
safety 
Duty Control Manager (DCM) A train-operating company manager in charge of a particular shift of 
operation. Sometimes known as Route Control Manager. 
Duty Fleet Manager / DFM A train-operating company manager in charge of engines and rolling 
stock (planning thereof) 
Drivers / Train Drivers Train-operating company employees who drive trains 
EUS Station code for Euston (London) 
FGW First Great Western—a train-operating company 
Frontline platform staff Train-operating company staff who deal with customers—on trains 
and off trains 
JASMIN A supplier of information systems to railway companies—in this case 
passenger information systems  
HOH Station code for Harrow-on-the-Hill 
HWY Station code for High Wycombe 
IC  Incident Controller 
KeInform+ A customer information system provided by KeTech 
LM London Midland—a train operation company 
LMS Station code for Leamington Spa 
LOROL London Overground Rail Operations Ltd. A train Operating Company  
LUL London Underground Ltd. 
Maintenance Train-operating employees who fix and maintain trains 
MET Metropolitan Line—London Underground Ltd. 
Mobile Operations Managers 
– MOMs - Network Rail 
Network Rail employees who resolve disruptive incidents especially 
those concerning safety, track and signalling 
MoD Ministry of Defence (UK Government) 
MYB Station code for Marylebone (London) 
Network Rail / NR A quango that operates the UK rail network 
NRE Network Rail Enquiries—customer website that provides rail 
information and other customer services 
NRCC Network Rail Communications Centre 
NWR Normal working resumed 
OIS Operational Information System 
On-Call Network Rail Staff Staff not at work but who can be called on for extra support during a 
disruption 
On-Call Managers Train-operating company staff not at work but who can be called on 
for extra support during a disruption 
Other TOCs Other train-operating companies in GB who operate franchises 
OTM  On the move 
Passenger Service Director / 
Customer Service Director 
A train-operating company senior manager responsible for 
passenger service 
PIDD Passenger information during disruption  
Points clipped Points physically held secure  
PRR Station code for Princes Risborough 
Route Control messages Message sent by the Route Control Manager 
Rail, Maritime and Transport 
(RMT) Union 
A trade union representing rail workers in the UK 
Route Control Manager A train-operating company manager in charge of a part of a network. 
Sometimes known as a Duty Control Manager.  
S&T Signalling and Track (maintenance) 
Signal Controller / Signaller A Network Rail employee who controls track signals 
SPAD Signal Passed At Danger 
RDG Rail Delivery Group—a government working group 
RSSB Rail Systems and Safety Board for the UK—a government body 
tasked to improve overall rail service  
RTS Rail Technical Strategy—produced by the Rail Delivery Group 
(RDG) 
SIO Senior Incident Officer—the senior person at an incident  
Social Media Manager Member of the train operating company responsible for social media 
(such as Facebook and Twitter) 
Service Information Controller 
(SIC) 
A train-operating company employee responsible for communication 
generated on behalf of the Duty Control Manager 
Station Manager / Duty Station 
Manager (DSM) 
A train-operating company employee in charge of a station (per shift) 
TBW Temporary Block Working, a method of safe working employed 
when the signalling system is not operational 
TMIS Real-time information system providing information on train position 
(by track sector) 
Train Manager A train-operating company employee in charge of the train crew 
Train Schedule Planner A train-operating company employee who works with Network Rail 
to produce rail schedule timetables 
TSLG Technical Strategy Leadership Group—a cross-industry body of 
experts tasked to improve rail services—part of the RSSB 
Tyrell An industry messaging system used by train-operating companies to 
communicate—internally and externally—about disruptions and to 
other customer information platforms. Provided by Nexus Alpha 
TOC A train-operating company 
VT / Virgin  Virgin Trains—a train-operating company 
Wembley LMD depot Wembley London Maintenance Depot 
XC Cross Country—a train-operating company in the Arriva Group 
 
 
 
